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PANEL ONE: CLASSIFICATION AND ACCESS TO NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
Moderator:
Mary-Rose Papandrea*
Panelists:
Margaret Kwoka, David Pozen, Stephen I. Vladeck**
The following is a transcript of the first panel, discussing
classification and access to national security information, of First
Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium on National Security,
Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment.1 The virtual event also
featured a keynote address by Mary-Rose Papandrea2 and a second panel
on The Press, Whistleblowers, and Government Information Leaks.3
Papandrea: You guys are in for a treat. We have three of
the leading scholars, maybe the leading scholars, on this panel
and the next panel on these issues. First, I'll start with
introducing Margaret Kwoka. Margaret is a professor at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, where she teaches
administrative law, federal courts, national security, and civil
procedure, which you all know I love. We are meant to be
soulmates. I can tell. Her research focuses on government
secrecy, FOIA, procedural justice, and judicial review of agency
actions. She's been published in the Yale Law Journal and a
number of other journals, and she is perhaps the leading expert
on FOIA. So, thank you, Margaret, for joining us today.
Next, I’ll introduce David Pozen. David is the Vice Dean
of Intellectual Life and a Charles Keller Beekman Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School. He is a leading expert––maybe
* Mary-Rose Papandrea is the Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of
Constitutional Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of
North Carolina School of Law.
** Margaret Kwoka is a Professor of Law at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. David Pozen is the Vice Dean for Intellectual Life and Charles Keller
Beekman Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Stephen I. Vladeck is the
Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the University of Texas at Austin
School of Law.
1
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity. The editors have also inserted
footnotes throughout the transcript where there are references to specific cases,
statutes, works of scholarship, or other sources.
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Mary-Rose Papandrea, Keynote Address: Examining the Assange Indictment, 19 FIRST
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we'll go with the leading expert––on constitutional information
law. In 2019, he received the Early Career Scholars Medal from
the American Law Institute. I mention that not just to show that
he has lots of credentials, but I really like the way they described
his work. They described him as a remarkable, widely influential
scholar, also creative and thought provoking. And that is exactly
the way I would describe him. So, thank you, David, for being
with us today.
And finally, last but certainly not least, Steve Vladeck. He
is the Charles Allen Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the
University of Texas. Many of you probably already know him.
He is a nationally recognized expert on federal courts,
constitutional law, national security law, and military justice. He
is a prolific scholar, so, I'm not even going to start to mention all
of his publications. But I will mention he is the coauthor on the
leading casebooks on National Security Law and CounterTerrorism Law. So, some of you are probably reading out of his
casebooks in your classes this semester. He is a co-host of a
popular blog called National Security Law Podcast.4 He does this
with Bobby Chesney, his colleague at UT. It is quite entertaining
and really well done, so I highly recommend you check it out.
He is also CNN’s Supreme Court analyst. And we're just so
thrilled you're here, Stephen––thank you for coming.
So, thanks to everyone for coming. My job as moderator
is just to pose some questions and let you guys bat them around.
I will try to stay out of your way. I thought, Steve, if you don't
mind, I'll start with you just to get us started and give the students
in the audience some background on our classification system.
So, if you don't mind, you can go in any direction you want with
this question. But can you just explain how our classification
system works? Why does it seem like the executive branch
controls the public's access to national security information?
What is Congress's role here or what should it be?
Vladeck: That's a great question. And I like going first
because then Dave can come in and clean up everything I get
wrong, and Margaret can scold both of us. Let me say first,
Mary-Rose, this is a real treat, and I really appreciate the chance
to be with you guys today. So, national security classification, at
least as so described, is a relatively modern phenomenon. We've
4

THE NAT’L SEC. L. PODCAST, https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/ (last
visited Apr. 21, 2021).
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obviously always had secrets in this country, but the idea of
national security classification, per se, is very much a product of
World War II and its aftermath––where the government was
trying to figure out how to handle massive amounts of national
security information; where secrecy, especially as the Cold War
was ramping up, became such a critical priority; where there was
more need for secrecy on the civilian side of government as
opposed to just in the military, as was true during the war. And,
so, it starts actually very much, or at least it really ratchets up,
during the Truman administration. Harry Truman was the first
president to issue a comprehensive executive order with regard
to national security classification, even though FDR had taken
some steps in that direction during the war. But I think one of
the critical points for our conversation is that, at least at first, it
was not obvious that this was exclusively a prerogative of the
executive branch.
So, there are a couple of early statutes––the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954,5 foremost among them, in which Congress
claimed a fair amount of authority to set standards for national
security classification, to identify what kinds of information
should be classified, and to actually assert a constitutional role in
the conversation. I think part of how we've gotten to where we
are today, which is a classification system that is very badly, in
my view, broken, is that Congress has mostly abandoned the
field in the decades since. What started as, I think, an interest in,
not perfect, but thoughtful power sharing arrangements has
really drifted toward almost pure unilateral executive branch
control, to the point where, today, the executive branch asserts,
almost reflexively, that national security classification is an
inherent power of the President and, perhaps even in some
circumstances, one that Congress lacks the power to regulate at
all. So, as we talk about what's wrong with the state of national
security information today, I actually think the foundational
problem is the drift in power, in regulatory authority, away from
a sort of joint approach between the political branches and
toward the executive, where Congress has basically just dropped
the ball and no longer even thinks it's its job to really be actively
involved in regulating national security information.

5

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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Papandrea: Yeah, that's great. I had a feeling that was
your view, and that is why I asked you that question. David and
Margaret, do you have anything to add on that point? David, go
ahead.
Pozen: Thanks. It's an honor to be here for me, too, in
this amazing group and also with Mary-Rose moderating. We
didn't get your introduction, but a leading scholar in the area. I
would echo Steve's points and just note that there's a great book
by historian Sam Lebovic called Free Speech and Unfree News, in
which he has a section about how in the late 1960s and early
1970s Congress had not clearly accepted the legitimacy of the
executive branch's growing classification system.6 And there was
this window in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate
scandal in which Congress was willing to enact framework
national security statutes in areas like war powers and foreign
intelligence surveillance, even against presidential vetoes, and
assert itself in the national security context.
Both houses of Congress considered bills in the early
1970s that would have legislated a classification system and set
the rules for what could be classified and how. But, in the end,
in my view, fatefully, Congress decided not to try to, itself,
legislate the national security information classification system.
Instead, they left that to the executive branch, as Steve said, and
allowed people to bring FOIA lawsuits challenging certain
information as being improperly classified. Then, in 1974, telling
judges they should not give much deference. It's debatable how
much Congress meant them to give, but the judges should really
actively review assertions of improper classification. And I say a
fateful choice because it turned out pretty quickly that judges had
no interest in playing that role. They did not want to scrutinize
secrets the executive branch said were necessary for national
security, and they ended up deferring very, very heavily to the
executive branch. So, I think there was a major missed
opportunity in that moment when Congress was asserting itself
for Congress to take over classification, or at least to assert itself
more than it did. Basically, the drift ever since then, ever since
the early 1970s, has been toward executive branch supremacy in
this area, I think to our democratic detriment. But I won’t say
more, for now.
6

See generally SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF
PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 2016).
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Papandrea: Yes. We're going to talk a little bit more
about that. If you don't mind, Margaret, David mentioned
FOIA.7 And, as I mentioned in the introduction, I think you're
the leading expert on FOIA. Can you tell us a little bit about the
history and purposes of FOIA and then if you want to share some
of the problems you've seen with FOIA?
Kwoka: Absolutely. Thank you. And let me add my
thanks both to you, Mary-Rose, for organizing and to the
students at the Law Review for organizing this great event. So,
the concept of government transparency is old. It dates back at
least to the advent of modern-day democracy––the idea that the
public would have enough information about what government
is doing to participate actively in government. But the idea of
FOIA is pretty new. And, so, the statute was enacted in 1966
and, as only the second such government records access
provision in the world, the legislative history is pretty clear that
the purpose of the law was to promote democratic accountability
in this kind of vast and growing administrative state. And
journalists were actively involved, not only in lobbying for but,
in fact, drafting the very first version of the statute.
So, although there is no limit to who can use FOIA,
journalists were imagined to be the prime intended users. But the
statute, as drafted, allows any person to request any government
records for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all.8 And
it lists out nine enumerated exemptions to disclosure,9 one of
which is the exemption that, in fact, bakes the classification
system into FOIA. Exemption one essentially just exempts out
any information that is properly classified pursuant to the
governing executive order.10 And that decision sort of ratifies the
idea that the executive branch should be making these
classification decisions. Certainly, as Dave mentioned, this is an
area where the amount of oversight that the judiciary should
exercise is debated. I would say lots of people are unsatisfied with
the amount of oversight that is exercised, which is to say not very
much, in terms of deference that's given. And that certainly is
one problem that has been greatly explored in the literature.

7

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
See id. § 552(a).
9
Id. § 552(b).
10
See id. § 552(b)(1).
8
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The other thing that I'll just briefly highlight in terms of
the issues with using FOIA for national security oversight is that
not only is that not policed very well by the courts, but, in
addition to that, mostly FOIA isn't used the way we thought it
would be for oversight at all, national security or otherwise. So,
if you look at our nearly a million requesters a year, maybe two
and a half to three percent of them are news media or journalists.
What has happened over time is that instead of requestors
seeking to inform the public about government activities,
including in the national security arena, we see just volumes and
volumes of very predictable routine requests for information that
the public has, potentially, a very legitimate need for but has
nothing to do with what we imagine FOIA would be used for.
And, so, now FOIA has become, I would say, gummed up, in a
word, with just huge volumes of non-oversight requesters.
Papandrea: Yeah, that's great. We're going to talk a little
bit more about the national security issues specifically. If you
don't mind, David, you have written some really illuminating
work on the history, purposes, and evolving function of FOIA,
if you wouldn’t mind sharing some of your thoughts on that as
well.
Pozen: Well, one place to start is where Margaret ended.
Who uses FOIA? So, I guess there's no very simple way to tell
this story, but there has been, I think, a lot of ways in which the
initial vision of FOIA has failed or at least not been fully realized.
And we might start that story with who uses it. So, as Margaret
says and as her own research has documented, at a lot of
agencies, it's overwhelmingly commercial requesters. At others
it's, what Margaret calls, first-person requestors trying to learn
about themselves and what the government has related to their
own lives. And you could make a case about commercial
requesters trying to learn about the regulatory environment or
about competitors or about relevant things agencies are doing to
their business, that there are reasonable causes for them to want
to use the statute. And same with the first-person requesters.
But, the fact that the overwhelming number of requesters
are from those groups has served to crowd out other more public
interested actors like journalists, who were envisioned as the
primary beneficiaries of this law. When Congress, in FOIA, said
anyone can submit a request for any reason at all––you don't
have to tell us why you want information, ask away––it seemed
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supremely democratic that it was open to everyone. But in not
making a choice, Congress was actually making a choice. There's
no escaping making these kind of allocative moves even if you
think you're not. Congress basically was saying whoever has the
resources and wherewithal to figure out how to use this
ostensibly open to everyone system will functionally, effectively
get prioritized. And, so, when you open the queue to everyone,
parties with the most money and time and attention to focus on
FOIA get to use it more. Because agencies withhold a lot of
information using the exemptions in FOIA, you have to credibly
threaten to litigate to get a lot of the most important information
in many contexts, and you're going to need money and lawyers
to do that credibly. So, one way in which I think FOIA has
evolved in unintended ways and in disappointing ways is in the
skew toward commercial requesters and not these public
interested requesters.
The second theme, already noted in our first set of
comments, is that FOIA has proven largely toothless in the
national security context in which, at least for some of the
constituencies, a key goal of FOIA was to open up the national
security state. I think instead it's largely entrenched and
legitimated that state and afforded only modest glimpses into
what's going on in the rare lawsuit that produces records. So,
there's also been this this story of national security failure.
The third thing I'll say, for now, is I think FOIA also has
effectively skewed the way we understand how the government
works. I say this because FOIA itself has strict deadlines on when
agencies have to turn over documents that have been requested
that are really unrealistic in light of the resources that Congress
allocates to executive branch agencies to implement FOIA. So,
the deadlines are routinely being missed and the volume of
requests is such that it's overwhelming for a lot of executive
branch agencies to deal with the FOIA requests that come in. So,
on the one hand, a lot of people experienced disillusionment and
disappointment in government through the FOIA process itself.
There's a whole kind of genre of journalism on how horrible
FOIA is and how it reveals that our government is feckless and
incompetent. Then, you get the records that FOIA produces, and
overwhelmingly what journalists do with them is tell stories of
government failure and fecklessness. So, at a second level, we
have FOIA kind of producing negative images of government.
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There has been some literature in the journalism
community about why is it that muckraking journalists––
journalists who want to tell stories about corruption and abuse
in society––shifted in the mid-twentieth century period from
looking as much or more at corporate private sector abuses than
governmental abuses, and that's been a kind of market shift in
where this kind of muckraking journalism focuses. I think FOIA
is part of that story. FOIA is a low-cost tool for journalists to get
certain sorts of information about bad stuff happening in the
world, namely, information about government abuse. So, it
channels journalists toward the now cheaper sort of information
that they can use to tell those stories––it doesn't reach private
sector actors directly, some other countries’ freedom of
information laws do. So, I think FOIA has given us a distorted
and far too negative view of how government works, kind of
baked into the very structure of the law. While it was meant to
expose real abuses and help promote accountability, I think that
the way in which it focuses our critical attention on a certain sort
of government behavior and not on what the most violent parts
of the states are doing––the national security law enforcement
agencies that are most immune from FOIA have enjoyed the
strongest exemptions––or what is happening in the private sector
has also distorted policy conversations and is a kind of failure.
So, I hope that's responsive to the question, Mary-Rose, but in
those three ways, I see FOIA as not fulfilling some of [its
purposes].
Papandrea: Yeah, and I do recommend that if you want
a deeper dive on any of these topics, these three panelists have
written extensively on all of them. So, we're just trying to get at
the surface of them today. Steve, if you don't mind if I turn back
to you, could you tell us a little bit more about what's going on
in the courts? So, one of the things I'm going to be pressing you
on today are all the different branches of government and how
they might play as a checking function on the executive branch.
We talked a little bit about Congress, and we’ll return to
Congress momentarily. Can we talk more about the courts and
why is it that the courts have rejected Congress's call to not defer
to the executive branch and look and see if something is properly
classified? Can you tell us a little bit more? And, Margaret, just
to tee you up, you’re next to tell us more about what you see
going on in the courts.

230

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

Vladeck: Yeah, I mean, I think it's the right question.
And, I think Dave already alluded to a lot of this––that courts
have, in many respects, underread both the plain text and the
clear purpose of FOIA. But it goes so far beyond FOIA. And I
think that's actually a larger part of the problem, which is that in
non-FOIA contexts, there has been, over the past forty years,
built up this massive doctrine of judicial deference in national
security cases that then seeps into contexts where statutes
expressly contemplate a role for the courts. So, FOIA is one
example. There's a statute called the Anti-Terrorism Act11 that's
supposed to be an aggressive civil remedy for acts of
international terrorism that courts have construed implausibly
narrowly because of concerns of interfering with national
security and foreign policy. So, I think, there's a larger trend that
really, again, started in the 1970s. This time, I think because of
shifts in the ideological balance of the federal court, shifts in
appointments to the federal courts where, starting with the
Supreme Court, but really quickly seeping into the lower courts,
there is more and more of this idea that it's not appropriate for
courts to, “second guess,” determinations that the executive
branch makes in national security cases and giving that definition
a very broad ambit.
So, national security cases are everything from classic
national security disputes to the dispute between Amazon and
the Department of Defense over the Jedi contract where
everything is national security. And this sort of goes back to
where we started because the justification for this deference
doctrine is constitutional avoidance––the idea that Article II
blesses the executive branch with a broad range of national
security powers and that it's actually a separation of powers
problem for the courts to unduly intrude into the sphere of the
executive in national security cases. The irony being that, again,
as came through in our in our prior colloquy, I think the premise
is flawed. I don't think Article II gives the executive branch
undisputed primacy in this space. I think the problem is that
Congress has largely abandoned its role in this context. So, we
see this starts during Vietnam as a military deference doctrine
about how we're not going to second guess things the military is
doing, but it quickly expands beyond the military to what the
intelligence agencies are doing, to what the FBI is doing. The
enactment of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in
11

18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq.
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1978,12 which creates an express judicial review mechanism, is
nevertheless perceived as further reaffirming. All of this is Article
II dominance in national security.
When courts start scaling back damages remedies against
federal officers under Bivens13––the idea that the Constitution
provides for damages remedies when federal officers violate the
Constitution––they start in national security cases. The first steps
toward getting rid of Bivins come in cases implicating national
security. So, I think Margaret can say a bit more about the
specific ways that the courts have, I think, underread FOIA. But,
I think it's part of this broader disease where, even the context of
a prepublication review dispute where it's a contract dispute that
obviously needs an arbiter, courts are like “oh, it's not our job to
really second guess what the executive branch is doing.” I think
it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the judicial role, of what
it was originally, of what the founders intended, of what
Congress intended, and of how this sort of judicial abdication
reinforces the significance of the legislative abdication.
Papandrea: Yeah, thank you so much for that, Steve. If
you don't mind if I just ask you a follow up before I turn to
Margaret. Can you say a little bit more, not just about the
constitutional delegation of this authority to the executive, but
the capacity and the ability of courts to be involved in these
decisions? Because I know a lot of people generally, maybe I'm
looking at a lot of my students actually, say the courts are not
well equipped to get involved in these decisions. So, I think it
might be worth pausing on that just for a moment and talking
more about whether the courts can do this.
Vladeck: It’s an assertion you hear a lot. And, I think
Harvie Wilkinson might be the most prominent espouser of this
assertion on the federal bench today. And here's the problem––it
is utterly belied by experience. What do I mean? Let's take a
couple of categories of cases. So, first, there is FISA, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, where Congress specifically
creates a judicial process for secret review of incredibly secret
national security processes and foreign intelligence

12

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, Oct. 25,
1978, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
13
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).

232

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

surveillance.14 The government has never complained that that
process has unduly jeopardized national security information. It
hasn't identified a single case where a leak came out of the FISA
Court. And the courts have shown they haven't always, I think,
gotten the law right––I suspect that we can each identify
decisions from the FISA Court that we disagree with––but no
one's questioned their competence to do it. And, indeed, in 2001
and 2008, Congress expanded the role of the FISA Court in
foreign intelligence cases, at least largely because Congress, I
think, rightly understood that reviewing highly sensitive factual
proffers in foreign intelligence surveillance cases is actually not
beyond the capacity of federal courts.
Let’s take a second example. Guantanamo habeas
petitions. So, we spent the better part of seven years fighting over
whether the federal courts could hear Guantanamo habeas
petitions at all from 2000 to 2008, and it culminated in the
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene, which said yes.15
Then, we actually had sixty-five plus Guantanamo habeas
petitions heard by the federal courts, even though the
circumstances of their detention were highly classified. Even
though the factual disputes animating the review were highly
classified, the federal courts did their job, and no one––at least in
the district court who was hearing these cases––none of the
district judges said, I have no idea how to do this. None of the
district judges said, this is beyond my competence. It was only a
couple of the appeals judges, who didn't actually have to review
any of that information, who complained about whether this was
an appropriate judicial exercise.
And then, last but not least, there’s criminal prosecutions
in national security cases, whether under the Espionage Act16 or
for criminal counterterrorism violations, where there's often an
awful lot of classified information that is at stake, whether as part
of the government's case in chief or as part of the defendant’s
defense. Congress has passed a statute to deal with the graymail
concern that defendants could use classified information, CIPA,
the Classified Information Procedures Act.17 But, there's also a
pretty sophisticated body of case law about how the government
14

See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (establishing the FISA court).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–96 (2008).
16
The Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 22, 46
and 50 U.S.C.).
17
The Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025
(1980) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
15
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can strike the balance between preserving national security
secrets and protecting the constitutional rights of defendants
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. And so, every time a
judge or an observer says courts can't handle these cases, I want
to point them to thousands of FISA cases, dozens of Gitmo
habeas petitions, and hundreds of criminal prosecutions and say,
what about those? And, actually, the Federal Judicial Center put
out a book called National Security Case Management Challenges,18
which is meant to be a guide to courts. It’s on my shelf, I should
have brought it as a prop. But it's like here's thousands of pages
of examples of federal courts dealing with national security
challenges, and not always getting them right, Mary-Rose, but
just dealing with them. So, every time someone trots out the lack
of competence argument, I say, well, I've got thousands of pages
of evidence to the contrary.
Papandrea: Excellent, excellent. Margaret, now that I
realize that you’re a civil procedure professor, your work makes
a lot of sense to me. I know you've written extensively about
maybe what we should do in the court system or some sort of
reforms to help this FOIA litigation in the national security
context be a little more effective. It would be great if you could
build on some of the things Steve said and share some of your
ideas in this area.
Kwoka: Absolutely. And, in the same way that I
completely agree, we have ample evidence that courts are
competent at resolving these disputes, I also think they're just
very reticent to in many cases. So, in some ways, Congress has
tried to re-empower the federal courts at various times. And I
think FOIA is a good example of that where Congress tried to
reinstate essentially de novo review after the Supreme Court took
it away in classification cases. And it was unsuccessful, to be
honest. If we look at FOIA litigation, there's been recent
empirical work done showing that it's almost impossible to win
an exemption one case, a classification case, under FOIA. And
I think there's various reasons why.
If you have some of your Civ Pro students on as audience
members, maybe they’ll appreciate a couple of the ways in which
I think courts are sort of shirking their duty. And a lot of it is
procedural. So, for example, in FOIA cases, courts routinely
18

ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, NATIONAL SECURITY CASE STUDIES: SPECIAL CASEMANAGEMENT CHALLENGES (6th ed. 2015).
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start with the premise that discovery is inappropriate. That's not
in a rule anywhere. Nobody has a statute about that. It's not in
FOIA. It's just a federal case with the federal rules of civil
procedure governing. There's no reason why people can't get
discovery. But, the courts say, “well, FOIA cases, that's not
appropriate.” Yet, there may be many factual disputes that are
not about the contents of the records that matter in classification.
It could be about the classification authority. It could be about
other things that were considered at the time, reasoning that
could be given without revealing the contents of the records. And
pushing past discovery, you get to summary judgment. I'm
hoping your Civ Pro students are appreciating this.
Papandrea: If they don't, I will kill them.
Kwoka: So, you get to summary judgment, and in FOIA
cases, the government bears the burden of proof even though
they're the defendant. So, that's different from a lot of litigation,
but it means that, at summary judgment, it's up to them to kind
of show their best hand and win or lose. And, yet, what happens
is they show their best hand, and, even when the court thinks it's
not good enough, they just let them go try again. This is certainly
true in national security cases, among others. Another, and I
think this might be the biggest one in national security cases,
courts do not want to use their power to engage in in-camera
review. And it's something that everyone agrees the courts have
the power to do. In cases where they use in-camera review to
actually look at the disputed records, we have no evidence that
this goes wrong. Just as Steve just said, we have no evidence that
courts are not competent to look at these records and make these
determinations. And yet, you will see case law saying, we only
use in-camera review in extreme circumstances or as a last resort.
So, they won't actually use the power they have to review these
cases.
And then, and this is maybe the most blatant national
security related kind of deference, but the standard is de novo
review. You will see court after court say, “yes, yes, but we give
substantial weight to the government's affidavits in these cases,”
and so much so that you will see cases that say we review
exemption one under a substantial weight review standard,
which is not a standard. They are in every way giving deference
to the government. I will say––and I know we've really listed
quite a parade of problems, and I agree with all of them––I think
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like Steve said, courts can do this, like we have volumes of
evidence that this kind of role is appropriate. That's true in FOIA
cases, too. And we also do see glimmers of success. And I'm
happy to talk more about ways in which I think there is some
evidence that, even in the national security context, FOIA can
be useful in terms of oversight and for journalists. That said, the
courts are not the place where they’re mostly winning those
battles.
Papandrea: Here's a question I didn't send to you all, so
feel free to tell me that you have no comment. Do you think it
would help to replace FOIA or supplement FOIA with the
recognition of a constitutional right of access to this information?
So, I know that such a right is not established by any means in
the jurisprudence of this Court. But drawing in part on Heidi's
work, Heidi’s on the next panel, and I was asked to write about
this recently for Geoffrey Stone's book on national security
secrecy.19 So, I was thinking a lot about whether there should be
a constitutional right of access to national security information
rather than a statutory one. Do you have any thoughts? Maybe
David, I'll go to you. Do you have any thoughts on whether we
should think of this as a constitutional right, rather than as a
statutory right?
Pozen: I guess I don't see the distinction as being very
meaningful in practice in terms of what it would mean for people
seeking access to this information. Although, there's a lot of
literature on how FOIA is effectively a quasi-constitutional
measure. In the absence of an affirmative right to know, as some
other countries’ constitutions provide for, we've basically
legislated the equivalent, and it provides for judicial review––
ostensibly under de novo, very favorable to the requestor
standards––and has a highly reticulated scheme for how you can
get this information. I can't really imagine that a constitutional
right would be stronger on the substance or that it wouldn't be
qualified by the same limitations, like for national security
information. So, I think the bigger problems here are not in the
formal classification of the requesting right––is it statutory, is it
constitutional, or both––but in the kind of problems that
Margaret and Steve were discussing, which have to do more with
judicial incentives than with judicial competence.
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I'll just add another anecdote quickly on that front, which
is my first job out of law school was working as an aide for
Senator Ted Kennedy on the Senate Judiciary Committee, and
we worked on a bill called the State Secrets Protection Act.20 It
was a response to perceived Bush administration abuses in
overusing the state secrets privilege to defend against civil actions
alleging torture, extraordinary rendition, and other abuses. And
the Bush administration would come into court and say, “no, it's
all privileged, it’s a state secret, whether or not we do
extraordinary rendition.” And judges were deferring in a blanket
fashion and just throwing out the cases at the outset. What was
so striking about our bill was it really just reaffirmed stuff the
courts already could be doing, just as Margaret and Steve were
saying. You should use in-camera review, you already can, but
it's a great idea. Special masters, if you find something really
complicated you can appoint a special master to help you figure
it out. You can ask for summaries of information if it would be
overwhelming to see the full scope of it.
So, the fact that judges already have this authority but
don't want to exercise it, I'll just note, could point us in two
reform directions. One is just keep bashing the judges. Pass
statutes like the State Secrets Protection Act, which just nudge
them all the more so to use the authority they have. Maybe try
to appoint some new judges who want to review this material in
a more robust manner. Or it could counsel moving away from
the courts and just basically realizing that even though they are
capable of doing it––as Steve notes, they do it in other contexts–
–they've shown time and again they don't want FOIA national
security review to be a big part of what they do. And if that's a
more or less stubborn, if regrettable, feature of our system, that
might suggest that Congress needs to do more itself, as far as
active oversight. It might suggest that stronger whistleblower
protections would be useful, or other affirmative disclosure
obligations where executive agencies just have to put stuff out
rather than respond to individual requests that can be litigated.
At a high level of generality––we’re all noting the same problem,
which is judicial review––we could say “bad judges, do more,”
and try to prod them to do that, or we could actually just move
away from the courts, if we think what we've really learned from
many years of trying to get judges to do more on FOIA is that
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it's going to be a very, very hard lift to get them to play the role
that many civil libertarians want them to.
Vladeck: I’ll say really quickly, I mean, my reaction to
that is, can't we have both? Right? Which is to say, I think there's
no reason why these reforms are inconsistent with each other.
The other piece of this, and I'm curious what Dave and Margaret
think about this, is, at least in theory, we now have a larger
number of judges who claim fealty to textualism on the bench
than was true for a long period of time. So, it seems to me that if
Congress were––to borrow Dave’s [thought]––to sort of bash the
judges a little bit, amend FOIA to make clear that various prior
decisions and interpretations were incorrect, and provide clearer
access to information in non-FOIA cases, it seems to me that,
yes, judges will still resist that. But if we're going to have judges
who claim that when this text is clear they have no latitude, my
reaction is, well, let's take advantage of that. Right? And let's take
that out for a spin. As opposed to the judges who are into more
purposive interpretations who could say, “oh, Congress surely
didn't mean for us to play such a role in these cases.”
Papandrea: Yeah. And I think, David, I read in your
work, and probably Steve as well, thinking about affirmative
disclosure obligations that don't wait for someone to ask for
something. And, this goes to a bigger question I wanted us to talk
about. You've given me so much to think about. I know
Margaret has written about your work, and I know that provoked
her to think a lot about whether we have fetishized transparency,
and whether we should rethink how important transparency is.
You've really made me think about how transparency, just to be
transparent, can't be the way we approach this, we need to think
a little bit more thoughtfully. I think in the national security
context, that's really important because, as we all know, there
certainly have to be some national security secrets that are kept
secret, even if judges did their duty to review FOIA requests and
so on and so forth. To preserve the ability of this country to
defend itself, some secrets are essential. So, I think that your
work has particular salience in this area, and I was hoping you
could share your thoughts on how we should think about
transparency––you're really changing the conversation with your
scholarship.
Pozen: Thanks. Well, I'll try to be really brief and just
note in recommending affirmative disclosure where agencies just
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have to put out certain categories of information even in the
absence of a request, I am really building on Margaret who's
talked a lot about how that could work. It actually does exist in
the FOIA we have to a limited extent, and I think we both think
it's a promising general approach to build on, rather than waiting
for a request to come in, responding, subjecting it to the
exemptions, litigating, and all the other issues we've just raised.
On the bigger issue, Mary-Rose, on how to think about
transparency in a democracy, I can't give a very succinct answer,
but I'll just say my main argument in some recent work has been
no one really thinks transparency is a first order primary virtue
of a good society. I think it borders on mysticism to think that it
is. Transparency may contribute in important ways to first order
values like self-rule and in some kind of deontological
democratic sense or effective government performance at
delivering important social goods or human flourishing or
journalism, you know, accountability journalism that works.
There are a lot of things that transparency may contribute to, but,
actually, if it's right that transparency is never the goal, it's other
things, we need to always ask, how well does transparency serve
those other ends? And when we dig into the empirical,
experimental, and theoretical literature, which is now global and
voluminous, it turns out to be really complicated. When
transparency well serves democratic accountability or effective
agency performance or pick your primary value, turns out to be
highly contingent and contextual. In a lot of cases, transparency
can inhibit deal making by members of the legislative branch. It
can produce skewed representations of government, as I was
suggesting earlier. It can kind of distort more than it reveals. And
working through when and how it does that is complicated and
probably not something I should get into now. But the big
message is, if it's right, that transparency is not something to be
reified or fetishized in itself. It's not a first order value of
government. There is no theory of a just society or political
morality that I know of that would say that transparency is the
maximand. It's just an input into other things that we really care
about. And then we just have to be kind of relentlessly pragmatic
and empirical and always ask well when does transparency
produce better or worse government? And that is going to lead
us in some cases to want less transparency, actually, and in other
contexts, like I think the national security one, to want a lot
more.
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Papandrea: Could you say just a little bit more, if you
don't mind, because I'd love to hear a little bit more of your
thoughts, applying your thinking on transparency specifically to
national security. You just said something super interesting,
which is that maybe we do need more transparency in national
security. Part of it is what we were just discussing how we’re not
getting a lot of information, would you mind saying another
word about that?
Pozen: Yeah, I guess this reflects in part my contestable
priors, my views about what the world should look like that not
everyone will share. But, I tend to think that we should be most
concerned about operations of government that are violent,
physically coercive, and so there's a kind of, I don't know, liberal
primacy of state violence and just what we should worry about.
And so that directs our attention to what the national security
and law enforcement agencies are doing right at the outset.
Second, we have a very well-established historical pattern of over
concealment, I think, in the national security and law
enforcement context. So, we tend to know that this sort of
information about areas where the state is using coercive force
and violent force, which we really want to know about, also is
an area where the government has persistently shown itself to be
unwilling to produce that information. If I were designing a
transparency regime afresh, I would think that we would want to
home in on the national security area as a kind of starting point
for where we need most transparency. In contrast, I'll just note
the U.S. regulatory and social welfare agencies––the National
Labor Relations Board, HUD, the EPA––these are world
historically transparent administrative bodies. They are some of
the most accountable and visible regulatory entities the world has
ever seen. It's not clear to me that marginally more transparency
for them would do good at all. It might actually be perverse and
prevent them from promoting environmental protection, civil
rights, and their statutory mandates. In contrast, I think our
national security agencies are relatively unchecked, have way
more money, way more power to do dangerous things in the
world. And, so, I would start from there. But that's a crude first
pass of an answer, Mary-Rose.
Papandrea: No, that's awesome. Margaret, I want to
apologize for failing to give you credit for advocating for some
affirmative obligations. So, please accept my apologies. I saw
you had written a response or a reflection on David's work
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attacking this sort of fetishism with transparency. I would love
to hear a little bit more of your thinking on how we should think
about what information the public actually needs.
Kwoka: Yeah thanks, and certainly no apology is
necessary. This is an open field with lots of people having
interesting thoughts about how we should move forward. I think
affirmative disclosure is one of them. I want to go back to
something that Steve said earlier––why can't we have both, or
maybe all, of these kinds of mechanisms is maybe where I come
down. Requestor driven transparency does become sort of this
burden on regulatory agencies and social welfare agencies. That
said, I haven't seen any alternatives that we know of that really
do some important things that FOIA does, and that really does
lead me to say I think one of the problems with this debate about
kind of costs and benefits is that with FOIA, you can sort of
maybe take a stab at quantifying the cost, both just in terms of
money and personnel time and burden on agencies and other
things like that. It may be imperfect, but you can sort of try. With
the benefits, it's almost impossible to quantify. What do we say
are the benefits of knowledge we get from FOIA requests? Most
news stories, journalists, don't show their work. They won't even
mention maybe how they got information. So, you don't even
know when FOIA or other open records laws at the state level
might have played a role. Even when we do know, how do we
quantify the benefit the public gets of knowing something? And
that's assuming that we're only counting the oversight benefits,
and I think it serves some other important roles as well.
But even in its imperfect state, a couple of years ago, I did
a series of interviews with journalists who are using FOIA a lot.21
And one of the things that I found really interesting was that I
was trying to group people by what subject matter they were
using FOIA to get at. These are, of course, a select group of
mostly investigative journalists who have the time to go through
this kind of process. One of the three areas I found that
journalists were really using FOIA was national security. And
it's counterintuitive because of all the things that we just said
about how ineffective it is. For example, you're going to have
David McCraw on later today, and he'll tell you that the reporter
he represents most at The New York Times in FOIA cases is
Charlie Savage, who's a national security reporter, who does
21
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more FOIA requesting than anyone else at The Times. I did these
interviews sort of seeing how journalists are making use of FOIA
and why in this area, and a couple of themes emerged. One is,
oftentimes, even if the security agencies themselves, like the NSA
or the CIA, are sort of impenetrable with FOIA, adjacent
agencies have a role in these matters, and, actually, you can get
really useful information. I talked to, for example, Will Parrish
at The Intercept, who uses FOIA in his reporting routinely and
used it extensively at the FAA concerning some issues that were
arising at the Dakota Access Pipeline protest at Standing Rock.
And Seth Freed Wessler uses it extensively in his investigative
reporting. I talked to him about a series he did for The Nation
about immigrant-only private prisons. So, [using FOIA to
request information from] security and law enforcement adjacent
agencies has been more successful.
Another theme that came out is that security agencies also
don't want to turn over information through non-FOIA
mechanisms. So, their public relations office, or their public
information officer, or generally their press secretaries, they're
not as free turning things over. There aren't actually as many
leaks out of those agencies as there are out of non-security, nonlaw enforcement agencies. So, given that the other mechanisms
for getting information from these agencies actually are also
more buttoned down, FOIA is oftentimes the only option. I
talked to reporters who said, yeah, it's not great, but it's the only
thing I've got left. And, so, I do think here we're talking about
the only mechanism we have in some instances. It's driven by an
outside agenda. Unlike affirmative disclosure, someone doesn't
have to preview what journalists might need one day or what
might be interesting or what might arise and come up with a
category that would encompass all of that. Unlike
whistleblowers or leakers, it doesn't depend on the individual
decision making of a single government official and their
willingness to risk some amount of personal consequence,
sometimes great personal consequence, to expose that
information or their own view of what the public should know.
FOIA is the only kind of enforceable statutory right where
the agenda is set by the outsider, and I don't see a replacement
for that. Now, I think that there are a lot of things we could do
to be making it work better. And I think a lot of them center on
trying to, as Dave said, have it do more of the work we want it
to be doing and less of the work that we don't want it to be doing.
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I think there are ways we can do that without sort of throwing it
out as a mechanism amongst the tools.
Papandrea: You just said a million interesting things, and
I wish I could follow up on all of that. But for the sake of time,
I'm going to let Steve follow up on whatever he found interesting
in what you and David have just said.
Vladeck: And I'd rather hear Margaret talk, but I’ll just
say really briefly, I think one thing about this is a First
Amendment problem, right? I really do think that I go back to
Potter Stewart's famous speech Or Of The Press.22 There are
reasons why we don't want to overprotect speech with the First
Amendment and why one of the ways that we preserve First
Amendment values is by neither shielding nor prosecuting,
particularly protected behavior. I think that's an important part
of the transparency conversation as well. I think what Stewart
said was that the First Amendment is neither an official secrets
act nor a freedom of information act,23 and I think that's the
balance that is the right one to strike. The reason why I think it
has gotten so off kilter is because striking that balance requires
active participation by all three branches. So, just to tie these
threads together, the balance is messed up because the branch
most likely to move the First Amendment toward an official
secrets act in that paradigm is the one that today has most of the
power.
Papandrea: Do you have any thoughts you want to add
before we conclude? And Steve, just staying on you, what sorts
of things should Congress be doing that it's not doing? And you
can go anywhere you want with that question.
Vladeck: A lot. Just to take a couple of things that I think
are relevant to this conversation, I think there should be penalties
for misclassification. As of now, the only incentive for wrongly
classifying a document is that it gets declassified. That's not what
we call a good incentive structure. So, Congress should think
about some way of actually putting teeth into classification
limits. Congress should reassert its own ability to actually have a
role in defining what national security information is and is not.
Congress should provide much more expressly for judicial
22
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review of classification decisions in other contexts, collateral
attacks on classification outside of the FOIA context. Congress
should overrule a whole bunch of pretty bad D.C. Circuit FOIA
decisions that Margaret could probably cite chapter and verse.
There are so many things, but they all to me, Mary-Rose, circle
around the same core principle, which is reasserting that the
national security information is a three-branch conversation, not
a one branch homogeneity.
Papandrea: Well, before we turn it to questions, and I
snuck a peek at the chat, we have some very interesting questions
coming our way. I want to give you guys a chance to, and this
will be a lightning round, offer your thoughts on the legacy of the
Trump administration and maybe what we can expect under
Biden. And so, David, go.
Pozen: I mean, disgrace, brutality. I'm not sure in the
transparency area that it's been so notable on FOIA so much as
it has been in ramping up assertions of executive privilege vis-avis Congress. Kind of consistent with Steve's story of
congressional decline, the Trump administration made more
sweeping assertions of executive privilege. We're not just going
to withhold specific documents, it’s whole categories of inquiry
we're not going to allow you to pursue. And then Congress went
and litigated those disputes rather than just try to directly punish
the Trump administration by blocking appointees or not
appropriating funds for programs. So, I didn't love the
congressional response to Trump administration stonewalling on
issues of executive privilege separate from FOIA but connected
maybe.
Just one other quick thing, which is on Steve's theme
about Congress. I find, Josh Chafetz’s work very useful.24 He has
talked about how there are some limited examples of members
of Congress using their power under the Speech or Debate
Clause in the Constitution, which protects members of Congress
from penalty for things they say in carrying out their official
duties.25 He notes, for example, that in the Pentagon Papers26
controversy, one member of Congress, right around the time that
24
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the newspapers were breaking the story, took to the floor of
Congress and just read into the record some of the most relevant
portions of what Ellsberg had leaked without fear of criminal or
civil sanction.27 And he documents how that has dried up.
Members of Congress basically doing their own version of
declassification, which is constitutionally protected in this
manner, isn't something we see happening with any frequency
nowadays.28
Ron Wyden at points in recent years was crying foul
about terrible things that were being done in terms of electronic
surveillance of Americans, the kind of stuff that broke with the
Snowden leaks. He wrote anguished letters about how upset he
is that the American people would be furious if they knew how
the executive branch was interpreting various statutory
authorities in the surveillance area. But, it didn't seem to be
something he was seriously thinking about that he would just go
and tell the American people. You know, he'd probably be
removed from the Intelligence Committee, but he would have
otherwise been free of sanctions. So, just another power of
Congress that's sitting there unused. The intelligence
committees, also, they have rules that allow them to declassify
against executive branch objections information they think has
been wrongly declassified. They almost never have used that
authority. So, sorry for going on and moving away from Trump.
Papandrea: You all have so many interesting ideas. I'm
sorry we don't have all day to spend with this panel. Margaret,
do you have any closing thoughts on Trump vs. Biden or
anything like that, reflections?
Kwoka: I'll just add that I think one of the legacies that’s
going to be really hard for us to climb out of is the damage to the
reputation of the press and the view of the press amongst the
American public. Now, I'm not saying we were at a great place
before the Trump administration on this front, but I think there
has been a deep cut into the role of the press, the view of the
integrity of the press. I don't know how we come back from that
any time soon, and I do worry about that legacy.

27
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Papandrea: I share that same concern. Thank you,
Margaret. And Steve, before we go to questions, do you have any
thoughts on the legacy of Trump and moving forward under
Biden?
Vladeck: Margaret's point is complicated yet further by
the ongoing fight over whether First Amendment-like ideas
should apply to social media in light of Trump's suspension from
Twitter and Facebook and everything else. I think the problem is
that we are certainly going to be having a national conversation
about free speech principles on social media. But in the wrong
direction, from my perspective, and in response to the wrong
prompts, where the notion that there's no such thing as bad
speech or that the right way to combat false speech is true speech.
I think we've seen a lot of evidence that that may not actually be
true anymore. Leaving aside Trump to Biden, I think Trump
himself is an incredibly complicated inflection point for the First
Amendment because even folks like me––who I would never
think of myself as a First Amendment absolutist, but certainly err
on the side of more speech than less––I'm not as uncomfortable
with some of these more restrictive things as maybe I ought to
be. I think that's a sign of just how much the conversation has
gotten messed up and just how much the dangers of leaving
everything to the executive branch going forward have been
exacerbated by the administration that was just not beholden to
conventional political checks.
Papandrea: Yeah, great observations there. I'm going to
turn it over to our symposium organizers to run a Q&A.
McNeil: First of all, thank you so much. This was
brilliant, and on behalf of everybody at First Amendment Law
Review, I am so grateful that you all shared this with us today.
I'm going to turn over to some questions now, and I will say to
audience members, you can continue to submit questions if you
like. But first, let me start with this one: Professor Vladeck just
touched on the prepublication review system for books and
articles by former military and intelligence officials. But could
you elaborate on the concerns with that system and the court
cases currently challenging it? How does that fit into this
framework and what you've talked about with regards to the
courts providing deference to the executive branch? Professor
Vladeck, if you would like to talk on that. And then anybody can
add on.
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Vladeck: Sure. And I'll just use John Bolton29 as a foil for
why the prepublication review process sucks. And I don't mean
to put too fine a point on it. The problem is that the
prepublication review process is basically almost whatever the
executive branch says it is. So, even if the executive branch
approves a book like John Bolton's book, and the book goes to
the publisher, if they change their mind before the book is out
they can just revoke their prepublication review. It's mostly
contractual, which is part of why it's so hard for those on the
other side to ever prevail in disputes because they've waived most
of their rights. But it's contract law on steroids, where basically
every presumption is made in favor of the executive branch––the
executive branch can change its mind with no sanction, the
executive branch can't really be challenged on whether the
information it's claiming is sensitive national security
information actually is. There's no real mechanism to collaterally
attack the assertion that information is not appropriate for
publication in the prepublication case review process. So, it's this
remarkable thing where powerful people who aren’t worried
about those sanctions can try it anyway, like John Bolton did,
but where the power is all sort of in one direction. And, there's
almost no mechanism to push back if the executive branch is
blocking publication or objecting to certain information for
purely partisan or political reasons as opposed to for legitimate
national security reasons.
Pozen: I'll just note there's a lawsuit right now being
brought by a group at Columbia, in part, the Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia University, along with the
ACLU, challenging on First Amendment grounds the
prepublication review system.30 In addition to the points that
Steve makes, that lawsuit highlights just how much standards
seem to vary. Depending on which agency you worked at, you
may face a very different prepublication review procedure, and it
is very hard to tell what the standards are. So, it's just kind of a
29
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labyrinthine and opaque process. And if it's right that FOIA is so
weak, much weaker than Congress initially intended in the
national security area, that makes it all the more important that
other transparency mechanisms can fill the void. The writings of
former employees about what they experienced, which come
with a kind of time delay for that reason are, I think, generally
less likely to be very damaging. These are people who generally
have been socialized, at least to some extent, into the
bureaucratic culture. They're going through a publisher, that's
another round of review, and there's some time lag between what
they observed and what they're writing. I think it's a kind of
publicity generally that we should want, and, so, I join Steve’s
criticisms of the existing system of prepublication review.
McNeil: Thank you both. Our next question is, can
Professor Kwoka share more about courts tendency to grant
substantial weight to the government's position or evidence? Has
this been a tendency as long as there has been FOIA litigation,
or is it a recent trend? How are those opposing to the government
able to overcome the substantial weight given to the government?
Professor Kwoka, if you would like to speak to that, and, then
again, I'll open it up.
Kwoka: Yeah, absolutely. The “substantial weight”
language arises with the national security exemption. In addition
to exemption one, which covers classified information,31
exemption three incorporates other statutory exemptions,32 and
one of them that's notable is a statutory exemption that applies
to most CIA information and intelligence information. It's about
intelligence sources and methods, which it turns out is defined
very, very, very, very broadly. When one of those two
exemptions is at stake is when you see that language crop up. In
1974 is when the amendments sort of tried to reify the de novo
review for national security cases in FOIA,33 and it was shortly
thereafter that you start to see courts develop this new set of
language that says, “yes, the review is de novo, but we grant
substantial weight to the government's affidavit describing the
factual circumstances that are dispositive to whether the
exemption applies.” And so, the answer is yes, it's been around
for a very long time.
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And the other, how you can get over it. Frankly, very
infrequently. Very, very, very infrequently. That said, there's a
couple of things that I think are worth saying about FOIA
litigation dynamics that change the calculation a little bit. One
is––especially those folks who can litigate because they have the
resources for a lawyer, either in-house counsel, say at The New
York Times, major media outlets who have the resources to
litigate or who have found pro bono counsel or something of the
like––if you have the resources to litigate, once you sue, everyone
sort of agrees that you get a better response. There's a second set
of eyes, there's an AUSA government attorney who's
representing the agency who's also looking at it, and says come
on, you can't really withhold all this stuff. So, there's sort of a
backend thing that happens between the agency and their lawyer
that improves the quality of the response and increases the
amount that's disclosed.
The other thing that I would like to say about FOIA
litigation is that a lot of it is winning by losing slowly. Oftentimes
if you sue a government, you've asked for a category of records–
–all records mentioning, relating, pertaining, talking about,
referencing blah, blah, blah subject matter, whatever it might be,
like the Unabomber. Then the question is, what do you start to
get as the litigation proceeds? Once you sue, oftentimes the
government says, okay, well, we'll give you this stuff, but we're
still withholding that. Then you might negotiate a bit more, then
release a bit more. By the time you get to summary judgment,
your dispute may have been narrowed down to a very small
amount of records. And along the way, you might have gotten a
lot of what you want, and then you'll lose. But you got a lot of
what you want before you lost. So, I think just looking at the
point of judicial decisions in FOIA is too myopic a view of what
the potential is there.
McNeil: Thank you. I'm going to read two questions at
once because I feel that they will be cohesive. What kinds of
reformations would you like to see in the judiciary to ensure that
the executive is not given excessive deference in national security
issues? And would creating more transparency in the FISA
Court help? And then the other question is, if FOIA doesn't work
as well as we hope it would and the courts and Congress are
deferential to the executive branch, is there any way to check the
executive's power in national security matters? It's a little scary
thinking that the executive has such control and is only being
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checked by the secretive FISA Court. Professor Pozen, since I
haven't started with you yet, or actually, Professor Vladeck,
you're unmuted. So, I assume you want to talk.
Vladeck: David can go first.
McNeil: Okay, Professor Pozen, and then we can hear
from Professor Vladeck.
Pozen: There are various ways I could go with that. How
to make the courts do more I think is a really tough puzzle
because if the underlying reason why they're not doing more
already has more to do with their preferences and incentives than
with tools that Congress could give them, as I think it does, then
it's hard to solve a problem that comes more from judicial
psychology, motivation, reputational incentives or the like. Then
I think we, both civil society and Congress more importantly,
could nudge the courts to really do something more like de novo
review, do more in-camera review. At a minimum that could be
mandated. Rely on special masters and the like. The substantial
weight piece that Margaret was talking about, that's from a
committee report. And Steve was noting how atextual judges are
being––perhaps ironically, in the case of textualist judges here.
The statute says de novo review; it's actually a committee report
that's being used to vitiate Congress's words.
Beyond that, I'll just note that there are other models of
getting at executive branch national security information other
than FOIA and judicial review. I think congressional oversight
is a huge one that could be ramped up. There are inspectors
general within the executive branch, but quasi-independent, who
have already grown in significant numbers in recent decades and
could be relied on even more extensively. There are leaks and
whistleblowing. So, I don't think we're trapped in that kind of
FOIA or bust, judicial review or bust, binary. I think there are
these models which have been to some extent developed in
recent decades, but I think FOIA gets so much of the attention
in these transparency conversations, sometimes to the neglect of
these other mechanisms.
add?

McNeil: Professor Vladeck, do you have anything to
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Vladeck: No, I mean, I agree with David. I don't think
we have to put these things in contest with each other. I think it's
all swimming in the same direction of providing more
accountability for the executive branch's assertions in this space.
McNeil: I think that we are going to end on this one final
question. If citizens have to go through FOIA to obtain federal
agency records that are not harmful to national security or other
exemptions, such as certain records from an agency like Fish and
Wildlife, is it feasible for agencies to make these records publicly
available on their websites or create a separate online
government database that the public can access? Could this help
decrease the amount of FOIA requests and lawsuits and help
return FOIA to some of its intended purposes, like national
security? What are the concerns about affirmative disclosure? I'll
open it up to anybody who wants to start.
Pozen: I think Margaret should lead us here.
Kwoka: Yes, absolutely, is the short answer. And, in fact,
this is something I've spent really a lot of time writing about––
you know, there is currently no mandate, incentive, or money to
do that. But if there were, and I think there's various ways one
could design those things to be operationalized, it would make a
huge difference. So, I'll give you a couple of examples that
support exactly the point that the question raises. So, for all of
these businesses that are requesting information from the
government, lots of them are just––by lots I mean thousands of
requests at many agencies, at EPA, at the SEC, at FDA, big
regulatory agencies in particular––they are routine. The FDA
gets thousands of requests every year for their facilities inspection
reports. It's just a different inspection every time, but they could
just post a database of all their inspection reports. The SEC gets
thousands of requests for publicly filed documents that were
originally under a confidentiality order and that's expired. They
could just be published online. So, for some of these things we
could make this whole category of records affirmatively available
and preempt the need for those requests.
The other piece of that is for individuals requesting their
own files. Most of them are actually immigration files. So, DHS
now gets more than half of all FOIA requests in the federal
government––medical files, law enforcement files, family
histories, a lot of genealogy going on in FOIA. We could find
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other mechanisms for people to get their own records, including
administrative discoveries. For example, any of you who might
be interested in immigration, in removal proceedings there is no
administrative discovery. So, the only way you can get the
government's file is through FOIA. We could look at other things
that are non-FOIA reforms that would preempt the need for all
these folks to resort to FOIA as a really second best [mechanism].
Most of these folks aren't well served by FOIA either. It's just
that they don't have an alternative.
The last part was what are the concerns about this? The
real concern is just that agencies have no incentive structure to
make these kinds of changes. And I think there's ways that we
could structure incentives, but there hasn't been any push in that
direction.
Pozen: I'll just add really briefly that I agree with
everything Margaret said. Where affirmative disclosure can
realistically be done, I think we should be looking to do more of
it. I would just note that it's political economy and kind of
sociology are different from FOIA requests. It's not so easily
weaponized. You know, the most well-resourced entities like
regulated firms in FOIA, they have a tool with which they can
get basically extremely cheap discovery with no limits on
relevance. They could just ask for everything in an attempt to
needle their overseers and kind of find out things with which they
can threaten to sue regulators, and FOIA we've seen weaponized
in a lot of contexts by regulated entities. That’s not so easy to do
with affirmative disclosure, nor do you need deep pockets to use
affirmative disclosure. So, who's benefiting and who's losing?
The profile looks different and, I think better, when you have
affirmative disclosure. And, the sociology point, FOIA
introduces a kind of adversarial dynamic in the relationship
between citizen and government. You want something, you
demand something from government, and you threaten to sue
them if they don't provide it. There’s some maybe European
scholarship on how this creates a kind of anti-governmental,
anti-statist gloss to it, the way that you're invited to see the
government as your litigation opponent through a mechanism
like FOIA. Affirmative disclosures, the government on its own
is proactively giving you stuff you might want, and it has a
different kind of sociological valence. So, I am all for affirmative
disclosure where it can be done.
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McNeil: Thank you all so much. This was so impressive
and such a wonderful experience. Dean Papandrea, do you have
anything you want to add?
Papandrea: Just that was an hour of heaven for me. So,
thank you so much for coming to hear the three leading experts
in this area. This discussion really made my year. So, thank you.

